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The Janus Decision and the Future of Private-
Sector Unionism 
 
Michelle Quach* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In order for a union to represent a group of workers, a petition to start 
the election process must first be filed with the National Labor Relations 
Board (“NLRB”) and it must receive support from 30% of the employees.1 
Once the NLRB determines that the 30% threshold is met, the NLRB will 
conduct an election to determine if a majority of employees want union 
representation.2 If the union is certified by the NLRB, through a majority 
vote, the union becomes the exclusive bargaining representative of the 
employees. That is, the union becomes the sole representative of the 
employees and may act on their behalves.3 Thus, if an employer wants to 
make any changes in employment, the employer must work directly with the 
union, rather than directly with the employee.4 Since unions have been 
granted the power of exclusive representation, they also have a duty to fairly 
represent all employees in good faith and without discrimination.5 This duty 
of fair representation requires a union to act as an agent for each employee, 
regardless of whether the employee decides to join the union (“full 
members”) or not (“statutory members”).6 Thus, as the exclusive bargaining 
representative, unions bear the burden of fair representation for all 
employees, regardless of whether they are classified as full or statutory 
members.7 
 
*  Michelle Quach, J.D. Candidate at the University of California Hastings, Class of 2020. 
 1. Conduct Elections, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/about-
nlrb/what-we-do/conduct-elections (last visited Oct. 23, 2019). 
 2. Id. 
 3. U.S. FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY, https://www.flra.gov/exclusive_ representation 
(last visited Apr. 5, 2019). 
 4. Bargaining in Good Faith with Employees’ Union Representative (Section 8(d) & 8(a)(5)), 
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect/whats-law/employe 
rs/bargaining-good-faith-employees-union-representative-section (last visited Oct. 23, 2019). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Gerald D. Wixted, Agency Shops and the First Amendment: A Balancing Test in Need of 
Unweighted Scales, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 833, 833 (1987). 
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When a union is recognized as the agent of employees, the employer 
can no longer negotiate with each individual employee about their terms and 
conditions of employment and must work directly with the union.8 Within 
each of these negotiations, unions can opt for union-security agreements, 
which is a contract that binds employees to pay fees/dues to the union so that 
the union has the resources to conduct services on the employees’ behalves.9 
Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) permits an 
employer and a union to negotiate for and enter into a union-security 
agreement requiring all employees in the bargaining unit to pay periodic 
union dues as a condition of employment, regardless of whether an employee 
wants to become a union member.10 Thus, union-security agreements, 
combined with the theory of exclusive representation, compel all employees 
to work under the terms negotiated by the union. All members must pay some 
form of dues should the union negotiate for such an agreement.  
When unions negotiate for union-security agreements, they can 
negotiate for different type of fee provisions. One type of fee provision is a 
union shop fee provision.11 A union shop compels all employees of a 
bargaining unit to become members and pay dues to the union, regardless of 
whether the employees support the union or agree with the way dues are 
spent.12 Comparatively, an agency shop fee provision grants employees the 
option of becoming a full member or a statutory member.13 As opposed to a 
union shop, agency shop statutory members can limit the amount they are 
required to pay as to their share of dues used directly for representation, such 
as collective bargaining and contract administration.14 Despite only paying 
dues that are germane to representation, statutory members enjoy the same 
benefits as full members who pay all fees associated with union 
representation.15 
However, when union-security agreements are implemented, First 
Amendment concerns are raised. By requiring employees to pay union dues, 
unions may be impinging on an individual’s freedom to disassociate with the 
 
 8. NLRB, supra note 4, https://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect/whats-law/employers/bargaining-
good-faith-employees-union-representative-section (last visited Oct. 23, 2019). 
 9. Union Dues, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-prote 
ct/whats-law/employees/i-am-represented-union/union-dues (last visited Oct. 23, 2019). 
 10. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). 
11.  David H. Topol, Union Shops, State Action, and the National Labor Relations Act, 101 YALE 
L.J. 1135 (1992). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Wixted, supra note 7, at 833-34. 
14.  Employer/Union Rights and Obligations, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, https://www. 
nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect/rights/employer-union-rights-and-obligations (last visited Oct. 23, 2019). 
 15. Id. 
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union.16 The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides 
that the government cannot abridge an individual’s freedom of speech.17 In 
Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. State of Ala. ex rel. 
Patterson, the Court held that the freedom to associate is a liberty protected 
under the First Amendment.18 Thus, the effect of restricting the right to 
associate, or disassociate, is subject to an exacting scrutiny review by the 
courts if the beliefs that an individual seeks to advance, either through 
association or disassociation, pertains to political, economic, religious, 
cultural matters.19 Under this exacting scrutiny standard, “a compelled 
subsidy must serve a compelling state interest that cannot be achieved 
through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.”20 
The main issue of this Note is whether unions violate an individual’s 
free speech when they compel the payment of dues from their members.21 
Unions depend on the collection of member fees to carry out the essential 
functions required of them, which include contract negotiations and 
grievance processing.22 However, if unions can no longer collect member 
fees from employees, unions will no longer be able to provide the services 
they currently do. Thus, jeopardizing union stability. Secondly, as the 
exclusive representative, a union is required to bargain on behalf of all 
employees, regardless of their member status.23 If unions don’t require all 
employees to pay union dues, a free-rider problem arises.24 If an employee 
does not have to pay any fee, but is still able to receive the benefits of union 
representation, a majority of employees will opt-out of paying dues and 
instead rely on the payment of others.25 Ultimately, the question is whether 
unions can negotiate for union-security agreements.26 
In a recent groundbreaking decision, the Supreme Court overruled over 
40 years of precedent. In Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. 
Employees, Council 31, the Court ruled that in places of public employment, 
public-sector unions may no longer collect agency fees from nonconsenting 
 
16.  Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, City, & Mun. Emp., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2460 (2018) 
[hereinafter Janus]. 
 17. U.S. CONST. amend. I 
 18. Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. State of Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 
466 (1958). 
 19. Id. at 460–61. 
 20. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2465. 
 21. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). 
 22. Why Do I Pay Union Fees?, http://ufcwlocal1546.org/faq/why-do-i-pay-union-dues/ (last visited 
Apr. 5, 2019). 
 23. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2466. 
24.  Id. 
25.  Id. 
 26. Id. 
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employees.27 In essence, public-sector unions may no longer collect any fees 
from any employee who does not wish to be a part of the union. However, 
even employees who support unions may choose to opt-out as a full member, 
and opt-in as a statutory member, for the sole purpose of obtaining union 
benefits without having to pay union fees.28 Since unions rely on member 
fees to operate, Janus raises the question of how public-sector unions will be 
able to sustain themselves and overcome the free-riding issue. 
Today, political groups who prefer extending Janus to the private sector 
remain. Because the Court has left this question unaddressed, this Note 
examines whether the Supreme Court's Janus decision can be extended to 
the private sector, and if so, in what ways the decision will be extended.29 
First, this Note will analyze the litigation buildup of the Janus decision and 
the decision itself. Second, this Note will examine existing law for private-
sector unions and the ambiguity it has left in the language of the Supreme 
Court’s decisions that may allow right-to-work organizations to extend 
Janus to the private-sector. Third, this Note looks at what is currently 
precluding Janus from extending to the private-sector and if there is a work 
around for the known obstacle called the state action doctrine. Lastly, this 
Note will provide insight into the possible strategy of right-to-work 
organizations, while offering countering views as to why such a strategy may 
not apply. 
 
THE BUILD UP AND OUTCOME OF THE JANUS DECISION 
 
THE ONGOING CAMPAIGN TO WEAKEN UNIONIZATION 
 
In a calculated move, the Illinois Policy Institute found a viable 
plaintiff, Mark Janus (“Janus”), to challenge the constitutionality of 
mandatory public-sector union fees.30 In coordination with The Liberty 
Justice Center and the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, 
Janus and the Illinois Policy Institute began the battle against the mandatory 
payment of union fees.31 
Janus and earlier cases are not isolated incidents, but rather, are part of 
a long strategic campaign to weaken unions.32 Despite being able to trace the 
 
 27. Id. at 2486. 
 28. Wixted, supra note 7, at 833-34. 
 29. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2486. 
 30. Noam Scheiber & Kenneth P. Vogel, Behind a Key Anti-Labor Case, a Web of Conservative 
Donors, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/25/business/economy/labor-
court-conservatives.html. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
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beginnings of Janus to 2015, the fact is, that the war against unions began 
long before then.33 Many of these right to work organizations received their 
funding from conservative philanthropists who wanted to see the end of 
unionism.34 The Janus case is illustrative of how right to work organizations 
have sought to destabilize unions, not just in recent years, but in previous 
decades.35 Thus, it is highly likely that future conservatives and right-to-work 
organizations will utilize the Janus decision to take on current law governing 
private-sector unions. 
 
THE CONTROLLING LAW BEFORE JANUS: ABOOD 
 
In its Janus ruling, the Supreme Court overturned precedent that 
governed union dues in the public-sector for 41 years.36 In 1977, in Abood v. 
Detroit Bd. of Ed., the Court upheld the constitutionality of an agency shop 
agreement within the public-sector.37 The Court’s rationale in deciding 
Abood was two-fold: the State’s interest in labor peace and the free-rider 
problem.38 First, the labor peace argument centered around avoiding conflict 
and disruption that would inevitably occur if unions would no longer be able 
to collect member fees.39 With regards to labor peace, the Court reasoned 
that if employees could opt-out of a union, they could also opt-in to another 
union.40 The repercussions of allowing more than one union would result in 
inter-union rivalries, dissension within the workforce, and demands from 
conflicting unions to the employer.41Second, agency fees prevent free-riding. 
Employees who did not want to join the union would not be able to reap 
union benefits if they were not paying dues.42 Therefore, in order to avoid 
the consequences related to labor peace and the free-rider problem, the State 
had a compelling interest to justify the payment of agency fees, regardless of 
whether an employee wants to join the union or not. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Scheiber & Vogel supra note 30. 
 36. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, City, & Mun. Emp., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2460 (2018). 
 37. 431 U.S. 209, 211 (1977) [hereinafter Abood], overruled by Janus, 138 S. Ct. 
 38. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2465-66. 
 39. Id. at 2465. 
 40. Id. at 2466. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
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THE FIRST AMENDMENT CONCERNS OF DECISIONS AFTER ABOOD 
 
In Knox v. Serv. Employees Int’l Union, Local 1000 and Harris v. 
Quinn, however, the Supreme Court recently limited the usage of Abood’s 
rationale by refusing to extend the decision to situations where it does not 
directly control.43 
In 2012, the Court decided Knox, which involved the Service 
Employees International Union, Local 1000, that wanted to collect a special 
assessment fee from California state employees to pay for a political Fight-
Back Fund.44 This fund would be used for a broad range of political 
expenses, including television and radio advertising, direct mail, voter 
registration, voter education, and get out the vote activities in our work sites 
and in our communities across California.45 The Court conducted a strict 
scrutiny analysis, explaining that mandatory associations are permissible 
only when they serve a compelling state interest that cannot be achieved 
through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.46 
When the employer, the State, “exacts compulsory union fees as a condition 
of employment, the employee is forced to support financially an organization 
with whose principles and demands he may disagree.”47 Writing for the 
majority, Justice Alito reasoned that when a public-sector union takes certain 
positions during collective bargaining, union dues constitute a form of 
compelled speech because the employee becomes associated with the stance 
the union takes simply by being a member.48 Since union dues are a form of 
compulsory speech, then the State must have a compelling enough interest 
to collect member fees. The State’s interest in allowing unions to collect fees 
from statutory members was to prevent members from free-riding on union 
services.49 However, the Court held that the free-rider argument was not a 
compelling enough interest to justify infringing on an individual’s First 
Amendment rights because less restrictive means are available.50 Instead of 
requiring employees to opt-out of union dues, unions could require 
employees to affirmatively opt-in.51 Thus, the Court concluded that 
employees who choose not to join a union have a First Amendment right and 
that the prevention of free-riders rationale was generally not sufficient to 
 
 43. Id. at 2463; Knox v. Serv. Employees Int’l Union, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298 (2012) [hereinafter 
Knox]; Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616 (2014) [hereinafter Harris]. 
44.  Knox, 567 U.S. at 303-05. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 310. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 310-11. 
 49. Id. at 311. 
 50. Id. 
51.  Id. at 317. 
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overcome First Amendment protections.52 
In 2014, the Court decided Harris, which involved personal health care 
assistants who were employed by customers of the Illinois Department of 
Human Services Home Services Program, who claimed that the Service 
Employees International Union’s (“SEIU”) collection of fees violated their 
First Amendment right.53 In Harris, the Court did not piece apart the levels 
of analysis for strict scrutiny because it determined that such a detailed 
analysis was not necessary.54 Although the State asserted an interest of 
promoting labor peace, the Court held that this argument missed the point 
because the employees did not assert that they had a First Amendment right 
to form a rival union, nor did the employees challenge the authority of the 
SEIU as their exclusive representative.55 Rather, what the employees wanted 
was the right to not associate with the union.56 Thus, the State’s asserted 
interest of promoting labor peace had no merit and was not an interest at all.57 
However, Justice Alito took it a step further and stated that even if the State 
had an interest in labor peace, any threat was diminished because the 
personal assistants did not work in a single place, but instead, were spread 
out within each respective customer’s private home.58 This, diminished the 
possibilities of labor conflicts. Hence, the State’s interest in labor peace was 
not a compelling enough interest to justify infringement on First Amendment 
rights.59 
In both Knox and Harris, the Court refused to extend Abood’s free-rider 
prevention and promotion of labor peace rationale, stating that “Abood was 
something of an anomaly.”60 With each subsequent year following Abood, 
the Court has become majorly critical of Abood by stating that its rationale 
has become troubling and problematic over time.61 However, despite the 
hostility the Abood decision has received over the years, the case was never 
overturned until Janus, 41 years later.62 
 
 
 
 
 
 52. Id. at 322. 
 53. Harris, v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616, 624-26 (2014). 
 54. Id. at 648-49. 
 55. Id. at 649. 
 56. Id. 
     57.  Id.  
 58. Id. at 649-50. 
 59. Id. at 649. 
 60. Id. at 627. 
 61. Id. at 635, 656. 
 62. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, City, & Mun. Emp., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2463 (2018). 
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THE CURRENT LAW FOR PUBLIC-SECTOR UNIONS: JANUS 
 
The Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services employed 
Mark Janus as a child support specialist.63 Janus was one of many public 
employees in Illinois that was represented by the American Federation of 
State, County, and Municipal Employees (“AFSCME”).64 Janus refused to 
join the union because he opposed many of the public policy positions the 
union advocated for.65 If Janus had a choice, he would choose not to pay any 
fees or otherwise subsidize the union.66 Despite Janus’ opposition to the 
union, he was required to pay an agency fee of $535 per year.67 Pursuant to 
Illinois law, even if a public employee chose not to join a union as a full 
member, the employee was still required to pay union fees.68 In short, Illinois 
law authorized AFSCME to collect agency fees from employees like Janus, 
even if they objected to joining the union. 
In overturning over 40 years of precedent, the Supreme Court held that 
public sector employees cannot be required to pay any union dues, regardless 
of what the dues are used for, on the basis of their First Amendment right.69 
Similar to Knox and Harris, the Janus Court underwent an exacting scrutiny 
review whereby “a compelled subsidy must serve a compelling state interest 
that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of 
associational freedoms.”70 Like the defendant in Abood, the State provided 
two state interests: the promotion of labor peace and the prevention of free-
riding.71 
In addressing the labor peace interest, the Janus Court articulated that 
its fears of disruption to labor peace in Abood were unfounded; as time 
revealed that labor peace could be achieved through less restrictive means, 
it would not infringe on an individual’s First Amendment right.72 The Court 
cited to the fact that there are millions of public employees in 28 states that 
all have state laws that prohibit agency fees, but the employees are still 
represented by unions who serve as their exclusive representative.73 Thus, by 
looking at other states, labor peace could still be achieved through other 
methods without requiring employees to pay a fee and associate with a union. 
 
 63. Id. at 2461. 
 64. Id.  
65.  Id. at 2461-62. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 315/6 (1984). 
 69. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2461 (2018). 
 70. Id. at 2465. 
 71. Id. at 2465-66. 
 72. Id. at 2448. 
 73. Id. 
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Secondly, the Court refused to uphold agency fees on the free-rider 
argument.74 It reasoned that the State may have two possible compelling 
interests in the payment of agency fees because (1) unions would be 
unwilling to represent statutory members, or (2) it would be fundamentally 
unfair to require unions to provide fair representation for statutory members 
if those members were not required to pay.75 
In addressing both arguments, the Court reasoned that since the union 
chooses to be an exclusive representative, it must bear the cost of representing 
all employees in a bargaining unit.76 The Court further explained that unions 
derive significant benefits from being an exclusive representative, such as 
obtaining information about employees and having dues and fees deducted 
directly from employee wages.77 The benefits conferred upon the union 
significantly outweigh the burden of exclusive representation for statutory 
members.78 Moreover, any unwanted burden imposed by representation of 
statutory members can be eliminated through less restrictive means than the 
requirement of agency fees, such as denying individual members union 
representation altogether.79 Thus, the argument that unions were unwilling to 
represent statutory members was not a compelling interest, and the imposition 
of agency fees was not a less restrictive means to satisfy the exacting scrutiny 
standard. Thus, the Court ultimately held that public-sector agency fees are 
unconstitutional because the frameworks that upheld Abood were unfounded 
as the decision played out overtime.80 
 
THE POSSIBILITY OF THE JANUS DECISION BEING 
EXTENDED TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
 
THE CURRENT LAW FOR PRIVATE-SECTOR UNIONS 
 
As opposed to recent law holding that the collection of agency fees in 
the public sector is unconstitutional, current law for private-sector unions 
still allow unions to collect member fees. In NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 
the Supreme Court decided the issue of whether an agency shop constitutes 
an unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA.81 The Court 
recognized the free-rider problem in alignment with the public sector 
 
 74. Id. at 2469. 
 75. Id. at 2448. 
 76. Id. at 2448. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
80.  Id. at 2460. 
 81. NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 735 (1963) [hereinafter General Motor Corp.]. 
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rationale in Abood.82 In upholding agency fees under the NLRA, the Court 
restricted the type of dues that may be collected from employees; it provided 
that “the burdens of membership upon which employment may be 
conditioned are expressly limited to the payment of initiation fees and 
monthly dues.”83 The Court ultimately held that “membership as a condition 
of employment is whittled down to its financial core.”84 
Roughly 25 years later, in Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, the issue 
of agency fees appeared yet again.85 The issue was whether agency fees 
permit a union, despite the objections of statutory members, to spend the fees 
on activities that are unrelated to collective bargaining, contract 
administration, or grievance adjustment.86 More specifically, the Beck Court 
discussed the potential violations of employees’ First Amendment Right, an 
issue not raised in General Motors Corp. In Beck, 20 employees, who chose 
not to become full members of the union, challenged the union’s expenditure 
of their fees on activities unrelated to collective bargaining.87 The employees 
alleged that the union used their fees on activities such as organizing the 
employees of other employers, lobbying for labor legislation, and 
participating in social, charitable, and political work, which violated their 
First Amendment rights.88 Reiterating the reasoning in General Motors 
Corp., the Beck Court provided that membership must be “whittled down to 
its financial core.”89 The Court resolved the ambiguity of “financial core” in 
Beck, holding that “financial core” only includes the obligation to support 
union activities that are germane to collective bargaining, contract 
administration, and grievance adjustment.90 Any activities outside of this 
purview violates Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA.91 The Court again reasoned 
that Congress’ intent of allowing union-security agreements was to prevent 
free-riding by employees who did not want to be in the union.92 Importantly, 
the Court did not reach the First Amendment issue raised by the employees.93 
Thus, under General Motors Corp. and Beck, private sector unions may 
continue to collect agency fees from statutory members, but must limit their 
expenditure of fees to activities that are germane to the bargaining unit. 
 
 82. Id. at 740-41. 
 83. Id. at 742. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 738 (1988) [hereinafter Beck]. 
 86. Id. at 738. 
 87. Id. at 739-40. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 745. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 750. 
 93. Id. at 763 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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THE FIRST AMENDMENT AS A SWORD 
 
Despite the Court’s holdings in General Motors Corp. and Beck, Janus’ 
extension to the private sector is not completely outrageous. One labor law 
expert, Cesar Rosado, pointed out that the current barrier preventing courts 
from extending Janus to the private sector is the idea that the First 
Amendment does not afford the private sector the same protections as it does 
in the public sector.94 This is primarily due to the fact that there is no 
government action to trigger First Amendment protections in the private 
sector.95 However, Rosado argues that private sector employees are governed 
under a federal statute, the NLRA, that compels employers to bargain with 
unions, which ultimately could be sufficient to trigger government action.96 
Rosado’s theory is not unfounded because there is ambiguity even 
within the Supreme Court as to whether Janus may one day extend beyond 
the public sector. In Janus, Justice Alito intentionally avoided the 
applicability of agency fees’ to the private sector.97 He explicitly reserved 
the question of whether Congress’ enactment of a provision allowing, but 
not requiring, private parties to enter into union-security agreements was 
sufficient to establish government action.98 Thus, the majority constructed a 
barrier which leaves the question of Janus’ extension to the private sector, 
namely through Beck, unanswered.99 
Even within the Fourth Circuit Court’s decision in Beck, the majority 
refused to answer the question of whether the First Amendment was 
implicated.100 By using the rules of statutory interpretation of constitutional 
avoidance to dodge applicability of the First Amendment, the court 
ultimately decided the case on statutory grounds.101 The canon of 
constitutional avoidance states that if courts are able to decide an issue by a 
construction of the statute, they will prefer avoiding a constitutional issue.102 
Thus, in the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Beck, the court determined that the 
issue of agency fees could be resolved by interpretation of the NLRA and 
 
 94. Cesar Rosado is the co-director of the Institute for Law and the Workplace at Chicago-Kent 
College of Law. Alexia Elejalde-Ruiz Supreme Court’s Janus Ruling Could Undercut Private Sector 
Unions Too, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (July 11, 2018), https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-janus-
private-sector-ramifications-20180709-story.html. 
 95. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, City, & Mun. Emp., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2479 n.24 (2018). 
 96. Elejalde-Ruiz supra note 94.  
 97. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2479. n.24. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Beck v. Commc'ns Workers of Am. (C.W.A.), 776 F.2d 1187, 1196 (4th Cir. 1985), on 
reh'g, 800 F.2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1986), aff'd sub nom. Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 
(1988). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
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ultimately declined to answer the First Amendment issue before it.103 Despite 
deciding the case on statutory grounds, the majority provided dictum which 
stated, in their opinion, there was sufficient government action to trigger 
First Amendment claims.104 The court explained that the authority of the 
union to collect union fees is derived directly from the power given to the 
union as a result of its status as a bargaining representative under the NLRA. 
When the union carries with it the power to extract fees against an 
individual’s will, and does so under the warrant of federal authority, it is 
difficult for the court to find that government action is not implicated.105 The 
court provided that “the union wears the cloak of the government; in making 
its demands it acts under authority vested in it by the federal government.”106 
Thus, there is ambiguity as to whether there is sufficient government action 
to trigger First Amendment claims in the private union-security agreements. 
After the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Beck, the court conducted an en 
banc hearing to determine the primary issue of whether the court had 
jurisdiction to hear the case in the first place.107 One of the sub-issues the 
court addressed was whether a First Amendment issue could be sustained.108 
Two of the same five judges opined that jurisdiction could be sustained 
through a constitutional claim, implying that in the Beck decision, there was 
sufficient government action for respondents to bring a First Amendment 
claim.109 
With the ambiguity surrounding whether union-security agreements 
provide sufficient government action to trigger the First Amendment, it 
appears that the state action doctrine is the current barrier preventing Janus 
from being extended into the private sector. As Justice Kagan stated in her 
dissenting opinion in Janus, “the majority has chosen the winners by turning 
the First Amendment into a sword and using it against workaday economy 
and regulatory policy.”110 The majority aggressively used the First 
Amendment to overturn over 40 years of precedent and weaponize the First 
Amendment for judges to intervene in economic and regulatory policy.111 
Thus, Kagan’s words of “weaponizing the First Amendment” may be the 
forewarning of the inevitable extension of Janus to the private sector. 
 
 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 1208. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id.  
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2501 (2018) 
(Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 111. Id. 
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OVERCOMING THE OBSTACLE OF THE  
STATE ACTION DOCTRINE 
 
THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE 
 
In order for right-to-work organizations to extend Janus beyond the 
realm of the public sector, these organizations must overcome the state action 
doctrine hurdle. Although it may seem fairly obvious when the government 
acts and when it does not, there are certain instances when even the action of 
private parties can constitute as state action. The Supreme Court has set out 
two different tests, the Lugar test and the “nexus” test, for evaluating whether 
state action is implicated.112 Both of these tests are analyzed below. 
Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., decided in 1982, is the landmark case 
where the Supreme Court laid out a two-step inquiry for determining when 
state action exists in the presence of a non-obvious government actor.113 In 
Lugar, the petitioner brought a claim alleging that in attaching his property, 
the private company, respondent, had acted jointly with the State to deprive 
him of his rights without due process of law.114 While acting on an ex parte 
petition, a Clerk of the state court issued a writ of attachment which was then 
executed by the County Sheriff, eventually resulting in petitioner’s property 
being sequestered.115 In evaluating whether Edmonson Oil Company’s action 
constituted state action, the Court followed a two-step approach.116 First, “the 
deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created 
by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the state or by a person for 
whom the State is responsible.”117 Second, “the party charged with the 
deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor. This 
may be because he is a state official, because he has acted together with or 
has obtained significant aid from state officials, or because his conduct is 
otherwise chargeable to the State.”118 The Court held that state action was 
present because state officials were statutorily required to attach property at 
the request of Edmonson Oil Company, a private party, and Edmonson’s 
joint participation with state officials was sufficient to characterize them as 
state actors.119 Thus, in Lugar, the Court found state action because a private 
 
 112. Topol, supra note 11, at 1144; Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982); Jackson v. 
Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (creating the nexus test). 
 113. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982) [hereinafter Lugar]. 
 114. Id. at 925. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 937. 
 117. Id. at 937. 
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 119. Id. at 941; see generally Topol, supra note 11, at 1145. 
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party was acting jointly with state officials. 
The second test used for determining whether there is sufficient state 
action is the “nexus” test, which was laid out in 1974, in Jackson v. Metro. 
Edison Co.120 The Jackson “nexus” tests asks whether there was a 
sufficiently close nexus between the government and the challenged action 
of the regulated entity so that the action of the regulated entity may be fairly 
treated as that of the state.121 In Jackson, the Court determined that there was 
not a sufficient nexus between a privately owned and operated utility 
corporation, that delivered electricity to service areas, and a state public 
utility commission, that issued the certificate empowering the corporation, 
to constitute state action.122 In making this determination, the Court struck 
down all of petitioner’s arguments that, because Metropolitan Edison 
Company was heavily regulated by the government, it enjoyed at least a 
partial monopoly.123 Further, there was a sufficient nexus for state action 
because the state commission granted permission to Metropolitan Edison 
Company to terminate electrical services to petitioner.124 
Thus, although the Supreme Court has set out the Lugar two-part test 
for evaluating whether state action exists in the presence of a nonobvious 
government actor, the Court has utilized a second test, the “nexus” test, to 
aid in the understanding of the second prong of the Lugar test.125 In essence, 
the “nexus” test is particularly helpful to understanding when a private 
party’s conduct is chargeable to the State.126 
 
STRATEGIES OF RIGHT TO WORK ORGANIZATIONS: DOES THE 
PRINCIPLE OF EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATION CONSTITUTE AS 
GOVERNMENT ACTION? 
 
In challenging the constitutionality of union-security agreements in the 
private sector, right-to-work organizations can potentially argue that unions, 
through the empowerment of a federal statute, compel private parties to 
associate by requiring employees to join unions and pay member dues.127 
One sub-argument is that by enacting the NLRA, Congress is pushing its 
agenda and hiding behind the union-negotiated agreements, which are 
 
 120. Topol, supra note 11, at 1144. 
 121. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974) [hereinafter Jackson]. 
 122. Id. at 346-47. 
123.  Id. at 358. 
 124. Id.  
 125. Topol, supra note 11, at 1144. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 1148. 
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sufficient to constitute government action by the union.128 In an article by 
David H. Topol, he argued that there is sufficient state action to trigger First 
Amendment claims and in determining so, he evaluated the two-part test set 
out in Lugar.  
First, “the deprivation [by the union] must be caused by the exercise of 
some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed 
by the state or by a person for whom the State is responsible.”129 Here, the 
argument goes, that the deprivation of an employee’s First Amendment right 
is caused by the exercise of collective bargaining because the NLRA, a 
federally created statute, confers two rights upon unions: the power to 
negotiate exclusively and the power to negotiate union shop provisions.130 
By conferring these powers to the union, coupled with the principle of 
exclusivity, dissenting members are now compelled to pay union fees.131 
Thus, dissenting members are required to “support” the union, depriving 
them of their freedom of expression and association; the requirement to 
“support” the union is empowered by a federal statute which was created and 
imposed by the government. 
Second, “the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who 
may fairly be said to be a state actor. This may be because he is a state 
official, because he has acted together with or has obtained significant aid 
from state officials, or because his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the 
State.”132 Here, the union is obviously not a state actor, but because the union 
has obtained significant aid from state officials, the union has effectively 
become a “state actor[.]”133 Topol argued that in Lugar, the NRLA provided 
significant aid to the union by granting the union the power to negotiate on 
behalf of all employees—even the members who did not want to join the 
union—by enabling it to negotiate union-security agreements that compel 
employees to paying fees.134 If the unions did not have the support of the 
NLRA, unions would not be in a position to negotiate for union-security 
agreements and bind employees to pay their agency fees.135 Incorporating the 
“nexus” test from Jackson, Topol distinguished the facts in Jackson from 
those surrounding union-security agreement by arguing that it is not just the 
presence of heavy regulation in labor law by the government, but the 
sufficiently close nexus between the government and the union’s 
 
 128. Id. 
 129. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).  
 130. Topol, supra note 11, at 1149. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937. 
 133. Topol, supra note 11, at 1152. 
 134. Id. at 1153. 
 135. Id. 
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implementation of union-security agreements.136 That the NLRA governs 
these specific functions of the union, the “right to negotiate exclusively and 
the power to negotiate union-security agreements[.]”137 Thus, according to 
Topol, the second prong of Lugar is met, which in turn meets the state action 
requirement.138 
Another approach to evaluating how Janus can be extended, is looking 
beyond the academic and theoretical application of the Lugar test and into 
the actual arguments by right to work organizations in the past. When Beck 
was litigated in the Fourth Circuit, amicus curiae briefs, filed on behalf of 
the employees challenging the union’s usage of their fees, addressed the state 
action trigger. With each brief focusing on a different aspect of the test, they 
serve to supplement Topol’s Lugar analysis by making the same arguments 
Topol made in his research note: that state action is present because a federal 
statute compels employees to pay a fee.139 
In the first amicus curiae brief, filed by former senators at the time, the 
focus was on the first prong of the Lugar test; the former senators argued 
that the deprivation of a member’s First Amendment right is circularly 
caused by a privilege that was created by the State and then delegated to 
unions.140 The former senators argued that state action was implicated 
because of a federal law, the NRLA.141 They stated that “private decisions 
will be attributed to the state when a federal statute is the source of the power 
and authority by which any private rights are lost or sacrificed.”142 Although 
both the union and the employer are private actors, the NRLA had given 
unions the power to force employers to the bargaining table to negotiate 
agreements.143 Hence, the government, in essence, encourages collective 
bargaining by playing an active and significant role in the creation of a 
collective bargaining agent.144 
In a second amicus brief by the Landmark Legal Foundation, it focused 
on the second prong of the Lugar test and the most contentious part of the 
state action doctrine. That is, whether the union had obtained sufficient aid 
from state officials so that the union may fairly be said to be a state actor.145 
The Landmark Legal Foundation argued that the union derived its authority 
 
 136. Id. at 1154. 
 137. Id. 
138.  Id. 
139.  Topol, supra note 11, at 1157-58. 
 140. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). 
 141. Brief for Harry E. Beck Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 16, Commc'ns 
Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988) (No. 86-637), 1987 WL 881079. 
 142. Id. at 18. 
 143. Id. at 17. 
 144. Id. at 19. 
 145. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937. 
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to compel the payment of dues from the NLRA and this compulsion 
constituted government action because a federal statute was the source of 
power that infringes on private rights.146 By enacting the NLRA, the 
government encouraged compulsory payment within collective bargaining 
agreements, which was enough to implicate state action.147 
Diverging from the focus of the Lugar test in determining the existence 
of state action, a different approach is used that argues because the Railway 
Labor Act (“RLA”) and the NLRA are similar statutes, so similar in fact, that 
the Supreme Court’s holdings regarding the RLA should be applicable to the 
NLRA.148 The RLA, like the NLRA, is a federal labor statute, but exclusive 
to railway workers that authorizes the inclusion of union-security agreements 
in collective bargaining agreements.149 In the amicus brief by the former 
senators, it argued that because the Ry. Emp. Dep’t v. Hanson Court 
determined that there was sufficient state action, it should give that same 
interpretation and hold that there is state action when unions compel 
employees to pay union dues.150 In Ry. Emp. Dep’t v. Hanson, the Court also 
acknowledged the existence of state action, despite ultimately holding that 
the requirement of union dues did not violate the First Amendment.151 In 
finding state action, the Court explained that the “RLA was the source of 
power and authority by which private rights are lost or scarified” and “the 
enactment of the federal statute authorizing union shop agreements is the 
governmental action on which the Constitution operates.”152 Despite the 
Court ultimately holding that no First Amendment rights were violated, it 
also “emphasized that its ruling was confined to the facts before it and did 
not preclude future considerations of challenges to the use of members’ dues 
for purposes other than collective bargaining.”153 Thus, it is possible that in 
future challenges to the constitutionality of union-security agreements, we 
may see the use of a RLA and NLRA comparison to establish the presence 
of state action. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 146. Brief for Harry E. Beck Jr. et al., supra note 141, at 14.  
 147. Id. 
148.  Topol, supra note 11, at 1137. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Brief for Harry E. Beck Jr. et al., supra note 141 at 14. 
 151. Ry. Emp. Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 238 (1956) [hereinafter Hanson]. 
 152. Id. at 232. 
 153. Topol, supra note 11, at 1139. 
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THE COUNTERARGUMENT ON THE ISSUE OF THE STATE ACTION 
DOCTRINE 
 
Firstly, the Court’s holding in Lugar, that union-security agreements 
combined with the principle of exclusive representation satisfies the two-part 
test, differs in outcome from its holding in Blum v. Yaretsky, that the Lugar 
test was performed incorrectly.154 Returning to the Lugar two-part test, the 
first part of the inquiry is whether the state has created some right or privilege 
that has led to a deprivation of rights.155 Arguments made in favor of state 
action suggests that the NLRA grants a privilege to unions to collect union 
dues, which in effect, deprives First Amendment rights. However, this 
argument ignores the historical background of unions. In actuality, unions 
have been in existence long before the enactment of the NLRA, and since 
union-security agreements are simply contracts, unions have always had the 
power to negotiate for and implement union-security agreements.156 The 
State did not create the unions’ power to implement union-security 
agreements or collect member fees; this authority was already created by the 
unions through private contract negotiations with employers. 
Moving to the second part of the Lugar inquiry—the main point of 
contention—it provides that “the party charged with the deprivation must be 
a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor. This may be due to the 
party being a state official because he/she has acted together with, or has 
obtained significant aid from, state officials, or because his/her conduct is 
otherwise chargeable to the State.”157 Thus, the question is whether the union 
is a “state official.” 
The argument in previous sections has been that a private union’s 
conduct is chargeable to the state because the NLRA provides unions with 
the authority and ability to compel workers into paying union dues by 
allowing them to negotiate for union-security agreements. However, in 
Blum, the Court stated that the fact that a business is subject to state 
regulation does not automatically convert its conduct into state action.158 
State action is invoked only when the state is responsible for the specific 
conduct complained of by the plaintiff.159 The Court’s precedent over the 
years indicates that state action is only implicated in private decisions where 
the state exercised coercive power or provided significant encouragement, 
 
 154. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1005 (1982) [hereinafter Blum]. 
 155. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). 
 156. Pre-Wagner Act Labor Relations, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, (Oct. 23, 2019), 
https://www.nl rb.gov/about-nlrb/who-we-are/our-history/pre-wagner-act-labor-relations. 
 157. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937; see also, Blum, 457 U.S. at 1005. 
 158. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004. 
 159. Id. 
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either overtly or covertly, that the choice must be that of the State’s.160 It is 
important to recognize that the NLRA does not require employers and 
unions to contract for a union-security agreement, but rather only allows for 
employers and unions to enter into one.161 The discretion of whether to have 
a mandatory fee provision is entirely negotiated and dictated by two private 
parties, something that the state is not responsible for.  
The NLRA does not compel these private individuals to actually have 
union-security provisions in their collective bargaining agreement.162 This 
scenario is similar to Blum which involved a state law that required private 
nursing homes to decide the appropriate level of care by using utilization 
review committees.163 In Blum, a private nursing home transferred two 
patients to a lower level of care because state law mandated the nursing home 
to make such assessments.164 The Court held that there was not sufficient 
state action to trigger the Due Process clause because private individuals, 
physicians and nursing home administrators, made the decision to transfer 
and discharge patients based on professional and medical judgments.165 The 
state did not influence the transfer and discharge decisions in any degree.166 
Thus, the state law that mandated the assessments in Blum, and the NLRA 
that mandates negotiations for union-security agreements, do not equate to 
government responsibility for the employee’s deprivation of choice. 
Secondly, the argument that the NLRA implicates state action because 
the RLA does as well, is rebutted in that the NLRA and the RLA are not in 
fact the same. The RLA is more compelling because it preempts all state 
laws that ban union-security agreements.167 The Court in Beck addressed 
these comparisons made between the NLRA and the RLA.168 The petitioners 
in Beck argued that, in Hanson, the Supreme Court found government action 
not because a federal statute allowed for the negotiation of union-security 
agreements, but because the RLA is supreme to any contrary state law.169 
The NLRA is different from the RLA because the NLRA explicitly allows 
states to ban union-security agreements.170 In Hanson, the critical element of 
federally preempting a finding of state action was missing from the NLRA.171 
 
 160. Id. 
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Thus, Hanson is distinguishable because there is a different, and more 
compelling, level of intensity to the RLA than the NLRA.172 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Currently, the Court has provided two separate laws governing union-
security agreements for the private and public sector. The first is the Beck 
decision, which held that private sector unions may continue to collect 
agency fees from statutory members, but must limit their expenditure of fees 
to activities that are germane to the bargaining unit.173 The second is the 
Janus decision, which held that public sector employees cannot be required 
to pay any form of union dues on the basis of their First Amendment rights.174 
The reason for the two separate laws is due the state action doctrine. In order 
for the First Amendment to be implicated, there must be sufficient 
government action. In essence, in order for both public and private sector 
employees to forego paying union dues, there must be state action by the 
union. 
This Note has analyzed the arguments both sides would make in 
deciding whether to extend the Janus decision to the private sector. More 
specifically, this Note analyzes whether or not the state action doctrine can 
be applied to private sector unions. The argument made by right to work 
organizations is that state action is present because a federal statute compels 
employees to pay a mandatory union fee. The other side of the argument 
states that there is not sufficient state action because the NLRA merely 
provides an opportunity for private parties to negotiate for a union-security 
provision but does not mandate one in the collective bargaining agreement. 
Thus, while both sides make compelling arguments, the likelihood that state 
action is implicated by unions is fairly low because no federal statute 
compels employees, but rather, a private party does. However, if the 
Supreme Court decides to extend its holding in Janus to the private sector, 
unions would no longer be able to collect member fees through union-
security agreements. Nothing could, or would, prevent employees from free-
riding. In the end, unions may not be able to sustain themselves off what 
little funding they can collect—should this hold true, we may one day see 
the end of unions altogether. 
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